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 Constructing Victimhood at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal:  
Visibility, Selectivity and Participation 
Abstract 
This paper considers the actors and contexts which frame victimhood within 
transitional justice mechanisms, using the Khmer Rouge Tribunal as a case 
study. Drawing on critical victimology’s concern with the cultural, political 
and legal construction of victimhood, this paper explores how heterogeneous 
legal and political elites can create layers of exclusion, shaping which victims 
are seen, and which are unseen, within official responses to atrocity. While the 
politics of victimhood in domestic and transitional contexts has been 
acknowledged within the literature, this paper’s actor-oriented approach 
contributes a thicker understanding of how ‘worthy’ victims are selected from 
all those who have suffered from mass atrocity. In particular, it considers how 
political compromises, jurisdictional limits, prosecutorial choices, and the 
creation of a civil party participation system have shaped victim visibility 
within the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. 
Key Words 
International criminal law; critical victimology; victimhood; selective justice; Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal 
1. Introduction. 
Since World War Two highlighted the grave harm so frequently inflicted on civilians during 
times of conflict, there has been a growing willingness to prosecute atrocities under 
international criminal law (ICL). This has been reflected in the proliferation of ICL 
mechanisms, including ad hoc Tribunals, hybrid institutions and the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Such institutions have often been analysed for their ability to bring 
‘justice’ to victims, and an ever-growing literature has developed in relation to victim-related 
issues, including reparations (Moffett, 2017; McCarthy, 2012), complex political victims (e.g. 
Bernath, 2015; Meyers, 2011), the role of the victim within the courtroom (Trumbull, 2008; 
McGonigle Leyh, 2011), and victims’ perceptions of justice (Stover, 2005; Hodžić, 2010). 
Parallel developments in victim-centric discourse and practice can be seen within ICL 
institutions. Victims have become a progressively central figure in courts’ legitimising 
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practices,1 while the inclusion of victim participation provisions in several courts have been 
heralded as signalling a move towards a more ‘victim-orientated justice’ (Vasiliev, 2009). Such 
developments have been accompanied by increased recognition within international human 
rights law of victims as holders of rights, including the rights to protection, participation, 
representation and reparation.2  
Despite this nominal move towards ‘victim-centrism’, the extent to which victims are rendered 
visible within these processes remains contested (McEvoy and McConnachie 2013; Kendall 
and Nouwen, 2013; Fletcher, 2015), and courts have found their ability to deliver justice 
subjected to criticism from victimised populations (Kutnjak Ivković and Hagan, 2011; Killean, 
2016). This disjuncture between victim discourse and the delivery of ‘justice’ can in part be 
attributed to the selective delivery of justice offered by legal institutions (Robins, 2017: 45).  
Only a small number of atrocities fall within the scope of ICL, and of those only some will be 
acknowledged as such by the international community (Cryer, 2005; Simpson, 1997). Even 
those victims whose atrocities fall within ICL may be excluded from recognition and redress 
(Robins, 2017), as prosecutorial strategies prioritise specific harms and perpetrators over others 
(Pritchett, 2008; Côte, 2005). Those whose victimisations are prosecuted may continue to find 
themselves excluded from or marginalised by the trial process, as adversarial procedures may 
reduce their visibility within the courtroom (Dignan, 2005). These institutional choices with 
regards to jurisdictional limits, charges, and modes of victim participation, create what Kendall 
and Nouwen (2013) have termed a ‘pyramid’ of victimhood, with victims of harm at the 
bottom, and those recognised by ICL institutions as worthy of redress at the top.  
This paper situates these institutional choices, the pyramid of victimhood they create and the 
selective justice they shape within broader criminological and victimological debates, drawing 
from critical victimology in particular. Rising out of a desire to critique definitions of symbolic 
or ‘ideal’ victims and perpetrators (Christie, 1986: 18), this branch of victimology is concerned 
with who has the power to apply the label ‘victim’ and what considerations influence that 
                                                            
1 See e.g. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, First Annual Report to the UN General 
Assembly, a/50/365-s/1995/728, 1995, paras. 1 and 198–199; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Third 
Annual Report to the UN General Assembly a/53/429-s/1998/857, 1998, para. 160. 
2 See e.g. UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UNGA Res. 
40/34, 29 November 1985; UNOHCHR, The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr 
M.Ch Bassiouni, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, 5 March 1993; UNOHCHR, Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 18 February 2005; UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, UNGA Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005. 
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determination (Miers, 1989; Mawby and Walklate, 1994).  Highlighting ‘hierarchies of 
victimhood’ (Carrabine et al., 2004: 117), which distinguish between those victims who are 
‘innocent’ (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012: 531-2) ‘good’; (Madlingozi, 2007) or ‘worthy’ 
(Tilly, 2008) and those that are not, victimologists have demonstrated that who acquires the 
label of victim depends not only on the victims’ characteristics, but on the reactions of others 
(McAlinden, 2014). Thus, there is a political dimension to the hierarchy of victim legitimacy, 
with the very term ‘victim’ being open to manipulation by political and legal elites in the pursuit 
of other goals (Dignan, 2005; Walklate, 2011: 189). In response, critical victimologists have 
sought to uncover victimizations that may be rendered invisible due to the political climate, 
social factors, or the marginalised status of the victims (Holstein and Miller, 1990; McGarry 
and Walklate, 2015).  
Although critical victimology developed in the context of Western domestic criminal justice, 
in recent years it has provided a framework for exploring the role of states in perpetrating crime 
(Kauzlarich, Matthews and Miller, 2001) international responses to atrocity (Letschert et al. 
2011) and the emergence of victim hierarchies within transitional justice contexts (van Wijk, 
2013; McEvoy and McConnachie, 2013). International criminal courts are increasingly 
acknowledged as having the power to produce and legitimise categories of victims, condemn 
perpetrators and shape understandings of conflicts (Mibenge, 2013). While the creation of such 
narratives is nominally based on issues of fact and law, hegemonic power relations contribute 
to the collation and interpretation of those issues (Mibenge, 2013: 4). Legal professionals, 
victor governments, other states, international organisations and donors all take part in the 
negotiating of law and fact, thus shaping which victims are legitimised within justice processes.  
While the literature has acknowledged the political and legal construction of victimhood within 
both domestic and transitional contexts, the precise processes through which some victims are 
selected as worthy of recognition and redress is a relatively neglected dimension within current 
discourse. This paper seeks to address this gap, providing a ‘thicker’ understanding of victim 
visibility within ICL (Geertz, 1993; McEvoy, 2007) by exploring a) how victim recognition is 
shaped by the specific political context within which a court operates, and b) how victimhood 
continues to be ‘produced, perceived and interpreted’ by the various actors engaged in the work 
of the court (Geertz, 1993: 7). This actor-oriented approach allows for an exploration of the 
different stakeholders within ICL, their heterogeneous interests, and their influence over 
responses to victimisation. Institutions cannot think for themselves, but are shaped by the 
approaches of those engaged in their work (Douglas, 1987). Indeed, the new, evolving and 
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often ad hoc nature of ICL grants its practitioners an influence beyond what would be found 
within domestic jurisdictions. Thus, an analysis of how the pyramid of victimhood has been 
shaped by various actors can highlight law ‘as a dynamic and, in some ways, even contingent 
process’ (Palmer, 2015:15). As will be explored through this paper, what is revealed through 
this analysis is a ‘layered’ process of victim selectivity, as political actors, lawyers, judges and 
civil society actors have constructed and interpreted responses to mass victimisation.  
To conduct this analysis, this paper focuses on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, or ‘Khmer Rouge Tribunal’ (KRT) as a case study. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal is 
a hybrid court (Raub, 2008-2009) established through an Agreement between the UN and the 
Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to prosecute atrocities perpetrated during the Khmer 
Rouge regime (1975-1979). To date, two cases have been tried at the KRT. Case 001 concerned 
the former chairman of the S-21 detention centre, KAING Guek Eav, who was sentenced to 
life imprisonment in 2012.3 Case 002 relates to crimes ranging across Cambodia, and the 
original accused were four former high ranking Khmer Rouge: NUON Chea, KHIEU 
Samphan, IENG Sary, and IENG Thirith. However, IENG Thirith was found unfit to stand trial 
in 2011, and the case was terminated against both her and IENG Sary following their deaths in 
2015 and 2013 respectively.4 Due to fears about trial management and the advanced age of the 
remaining defendants, Case 002 was split into a series of sub-trials. The first concluded in 
2016, finding the accused guilty of crimes against humanity,5 and a judgment in the second is 
expected in 2018.  
The KRT is expected to deliver somewhat broader social goals than are usually expected of a 
court. There is a high expectation that it will contribute to ‘national reconciliation, stability, 
peace and security’,6 and the Court is therefore expected to be ‘closer to the victims and the 
general population in Cambodia’ (Zhang, 2016: 521). Yet, despite these expectations of long-
term and general benefit, institutional choices with regards to jurisdictional limits, charges, and 
                                                            
3 Case 001, Appeal Judgement, 001/18-07-2007-KRT/SC, 3 February 2012. 
4 Case 002, Decision on IENG Thirith's Fitness to Stand Trial, 002/19-09-2007/KRT/TC, 17 November 2011; 
Case 002, Termination of the Proceedings Against the Accused IENG Sary, KRT Trial Chamber, 002/19-09-
2007/KRT/TC, 14 March 2013; Case 002, Termination of the Proceedings Against the Accused IENG Thirith, 
002/19-09-2007/KRT/TC, 27 August 2015. 
5 Case 002/01, Trial Judgement, 002/19-09-2007/KRT/TC, 7 August 2014; Case 002/01, Appeal Judgment, 
002/19-09-2007/KRT/SC, 23 November 2016. 
6 See Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/52/1007, 
31 July 1998. 
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access to victim participation have inevitably produced Kendall and Nouwen’s pyramid of 
victimhood, acknowledging, but also excluding a range of victimisations.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two explores the role of political and legal elites in 
framing which victimisations are acknowledged as international crimes and subjected to 
prosecution within the KRT. To do so, it highlights the limits that have been placed on the 
Court’s temporal and personal jurisdiction, the political contexts behind those limitations, and 
how prosecutorial discretion has further shaped the selective justice offered by the Tribunal. 
Section three then turns to the visibility of victims within the courtroom. The Court’s creation 
of a civil party system gives victims the opportunity to participate in its work as parties with 
similar rights to the prosecution and defence. Thus, the question of who is recognised as a 
victim takes on significant practical relevance, as recognition may entitle individuals to a 
number of procedural and substantive rights. Section three explores the crucial role played by 
the judiciary in the creation and implementation of this system, and considers the extent to 
which victims have been rendered visible through direct participation, and through their legal 
representatives. The analysis adopts a critical victimological lens throughout, while also 
drawing from broader transitional justice and socio-legal literature to enhance its analysis. It 
also draws from interviews conducted in Cambodia in 2013 and 2014 with court practitioners 
(18) and civil society actors (7), who were asked to reflect on the mandate and practice of the 
Tribunal, as well as the role of victims within it.7 Through this analysis, it seeks to expose how 
heterogeneous actors pursuing a variety of not necessarily aligned goals, have contributed to a 
layered process of selectivity, which each layer shaping the pyramid of victims who are able 
to access recognition and redress, and determining the victimisations we ‘see’ as opposed to 
that which we do not ‘see’ (Mawby and Walklate, 1994: 19).  
2. Selective Justice and the Construction of Victimhood  
Critical victimology acknowledges criminal law as something created and enforced on the basis 
of social convention and political considerations (Doak, 2008). Thus, while most of us will 
suffer harm of some kind throughout our life, only some of these harms will be defined as 
criminal (Hillyard et al, 2004), and only some of those who perpetrated criminal acts will find 
themselves prosecuted. While selective enforcement of law and prosecutorial discretion is 
established in many legal systems, issues arise when the selectivity is arbitrary or 
                                                            
7  
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discriminatory (Gelsthorpe and Padfield, 2003: 5). From a victim-centric perspective, selective 
enforcement renders certain harms unrecognised and without redress (Cryer, 2005: 193).  
This critique of selectivity in criminal law is mirrored within the transitional justice literature 
(Cryer, 2005; Damaska, 2008; McCormack, 1997, Simpson, 1997). As McCormack (1997, 
683) has noted, selectivity can be ‘found in relation to the acts the international community is 
prepared to characterise as “war crimes”, and secondly, in relation to the particular alleged 
atrocities the international community is prepared to collectively prosecute.’ Such critiques are 
linked to the concept of victors’ justice, and the argument that only ‘weak states’ or the losers 
of a conflict will find themselves subjected to prosecution (Damaska, 2008, 361). While noting 
that the very definitions given to international crime naturally already exclude a multitude of 
grave harms (e.g. harm caused by financial crises or poverty) (Kendall and Nouwen, 2013: 
242) this section focuses on McCormack’s definition of selectivity as limiting the acts that will 
be identified as falling within the definitions of international crimes, and the acts that will then 
be prosecuted. In doing so, it considers how the pyramid of victims has been shaped first by 
the limitations placed on the KRT’s jurisdiction, and then by prosecutorial decisions around 
which suspects and crimes to prosecute. 
The Politics of Victim Recognition 
The Khmer Rouge era in Cambodia perpetrated harm against millions of individuals, through 
a range of criminal acts. However, the years leading up to the Khmer Rouge regime also saw 
civilians suffer the brunt of armed struggle between a repressive monarchy and communist 
insurgents (Form, 2009), a four-year US bombing campaign (Kissinger, 1979; Owen and 
Kiernan, 2006), and the authoritarian violence of a US-backed right-wing military government 
(Chandler, 1991). While Vietnam’s toppling of the Khmer Rouge in 1979 may have ended one 
violent regime, it was not until the 1990s that a tentative peace returned to Cambodia (Ciorciari 
and Heindel, 2014). This is in part attributable to the Cold War politics which saw the Khmer 
Rouge recognised as the legitimate government of Cambodia long after their defeat, while aid 
flowed in from states fearing a Vietnamese expansion (Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2005; Kunst, 
2013). Thus, there has been a continuation of harm which cannot be attributed to the Khmer 
Rouge alone. Yet, while other acts of violence perpetrated against Cambodians arguably fall 
within the parameters of ICL (Owen and Kiernan, 2006; Fawthrop and Jarvis, 2005), they are 
not captured by the jurisdiction of the KRT, nor has legal accountability been pursued through 
other means.  
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This selectivity can in part be attributed to political interests. Although the new government 
prosecuted two Khmer Rouge leaders in the immediate aftermath of the regime (Gottesman, 
2003), domestic policies developed to focus on encouraging the defection of Khmer Rouge 
cadres through amnesties, and reconciliation through ‘burying the past’ (Linton, 2004). 
Internationally, Cold War considerations prevented most states from engaging with 
Cambodia’s violent past for many years (Fawthorp and Jarvis, 2005). With the thawing of the 
Cold War came new political agendas, and an increased international wish to hold the Khmer 
Rouge accountable. Domestically, trials were viewed by the newly formed government as a 
means of gaining foreign credibility, and threatening remaining Khmer Rouge into defecting 
(Ratner, 2007: 215; Strangio, 2014: 241). Yet a desire to limit the extent of this accountability 
was evident from early in this process. The initial idea of a truth commission received little 
support internationally or domestically, arguably due to fears about whether too much ‘truth’ 
might be revealed (Klosterman, 1998). A limited number of prosecutions suggested a means 
of both delimiting accountability and creating a politically acceptable narrative (Ciorciari and 
Heindel, 2014: 20-21), and negotiations commenced between the UN and the RGC in 1997, 
eventually culminating in the KRT.8  
The Tribunal’s mandate is specifically limited to trying senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and 
those most responsible for domestic and international crimes committed during the period from 
17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.9 By restricting the time frame, and referencing the Khmer 
Rouge specifically, the drafters of the KRT’s Law made a clear statement as to which 
victimisations would have their harm recognised through criminal proceedings. Despite the 
various harms perpetrated against the Cambodian population, these jurisdictional limits 
exclude atrocities perpetrated before and after the regime, as well as crimes perpetrated by 
foreign actors (Bates, 2007). Such a selective response to atrocity is in part a pragmatic move 
to avoid overburdening an institution with unmanageable caseloads (White, 2017: 138). 
However, in the case of the KRT it is also in part reflective of the agenda of political elites: for 
the RGC, the limited jurisdiction prevented a focus on crimes committed by those who 
overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime or during the war that followed (Heder, 2011), while the 
US, who played a significant role in the KRT negotiations, avoided attention being drawn to 
their bombing campaign and support for the military government (Strangio, 2014: 243). Such 
                                                            
8 Agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the prosecution under 
Cambodian law of crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea, 6 June 2003. 
9 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Law NS/RKM/0801/12, 10 August 2001 
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jurisdictional restrictions reflect McCormack’s first element of selectivity: the limiting of acts 
identified as international crimes. Indeed, they have been cited by members of the KRT’s 
defence teams as impacting on the overall legitimacy of the process: 
The legitimacy of this tribunal can be questioned, first of all because of the 
temporal jurisdiction; nothing before 1975 or after 79 is subject of any debate, 
where it is obvious that crimes against humanity were committed.10  
Mawby and Walklate’s (1994) seminal work in critical victimology places state actors in a 
central role in contributing to the victims who are seen compared to those who are not, while 
subsequent critical work has continued to highlight the role of political motivations in what is 
deemed criminal (Doak, 2008: 23). Within transitional justice, critiques that international 
courts provide selective justice and are influenced by political considerations are not unique to 
the KRT, but are made throughout criminal courtrooms and the literature (Meernick, 2003; 
Cryer 2005; Schabas, 2009-2010; Kramer and Killean, 2012). Indeed, ‘each war crimes trial is 
an exercise in partial justice to the extent that it reminds that the majority of war crimes go 
unpunished’ (Simpson, 1997). Yet such critiques are worth reiterating. While the focus is often 
on the implications of selectivity for the legitimacy of the ICL project (Cryer, 2005; Brownlie, 
2003; Wilkins, 2001, Damaska, 2008), such limitations also have very real implications for 
those most affected by mass atrocity: the victims themselves. In Cambodia, this has been 
demonstrated through many years of impunity, through the explicit rejection of a truth recovery 
mechanism, and through the exclusion of judicial consideration of the harms perpetrated by 
foreign actors, by lower-level cadres, or pre-1975 and post-1979.  
Prosecutorial Selectivity and the Visibility of Harm 
McCormack’s second element of selectivity, relating to ‘the particular alleged atrocities the 
international community is prepared to collectively prosecute’, also has resonance within the 
KRT. As with many domestic criminal systems, international criminal prosecutors are not 
under an obligation to investigate or prosecute every allegation of crime which falls within 
their mandate. Such an approach would overburden and potentially paralyse institutions and 
the graver the crimes and higher the number of perpetrators and victims, the more selective 
they are expected to be (Jallow, 2005). This ‘sordid paradox’ (Aptel, 2012: 1360) has serious 
implications for the victimisations rendered visible by courts: prosecutions have significant 
                                                            
10 Interview with Lawyer (Defence) 8 November 2013. See also Closing Statement of Co-Defence Counsel, 
Koppe, Trial Transcript Day 224, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 31 October 2014, at 45. 
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weight in shaping accepted narratives of a conflict or regime, and thus determining which 
victims are acknowledged as worthy of redress, and which are ‘symbolically rejected’ (Aptel, 
2012: 1372). However, despite the importance such decisions may have for victims, critical 
victimologists have noted that since the legal profession’s ‘theft of the conflict’ from victims 
(Christie, 1977), victims’ wishes are often considered a ‘secondary topic’ (Fattah, 1992, 198) 
in decisions around who and what to prosecute. In relation to who, there is a tendency within 
ICL to prioritise individuals who held positions of power (Damaska, 2008), while victims may 
also find their perpetrators excluded from prosecution due to political considerations 
(Gelsthorpe and Padfiled, 2003: 5). In relation to what, prosecutors have normally focused on 
a few ‘illustrative’ or ‘representative’ events (Waldorf, 2011; Côte, 2005) due to factors such 
as jurisdictional limits, evidentiary sufficiency, resource constraints, legal principles, and the 
comparative gravity of different crimes (Jallow, 2005: 149-153). While such prosecutorial 
strategies may reflect legitimate concerns, they also reveal attitudes towards which harms 
should be condemned, and which victimisations should be included within the pyramid of 
victimhood. 
In relation to who should be prosecuted, the influence of political considerations is highly 
visible within the KRT. During the Tribunals negotiations, while the UN negotiators had hoped 
for between 20 and 30 prosecutions, the RGC consistently argued that too wide a net would 
‘invite social unrest’ (Ciorciari, 2009, 72). As part of the government’s ‘reconciliation’ process 
had involved offering former cadres informal amnesties, the negotiators may have initially had 
legitimate concerns about a re-ignition of civil war (Ciorciari, 2009, 72).  However, this position 
has also been described by interviewees as ‘designed to protect the present people in power’.11 
Certainly, several members of Cambodia’s ruling party were Khmer Rouge cadres, and it is 
unlikely there was any wish to see liability stray too close to home (Strangio, 2014: 241). This 
perspective has arguably gained credence with the passage of time; while little evidence has 
emerged suggesting that prosecutions could cause social unrest, the RGC has continued to 
oppose any cases beyond Cases 001 and 002, resulting in tensions within and outside the KRT 
in relation to Cases 003 and 004. 
These cases concern the actions of former Navy Commander MEAS Muth, and three former 
mid-level Khmer Rouge, Ao An, Yim Tith and Im Chaem (DeFalco, 2014). Although it is 
undisputed that all four were Khmer Rouge ‘officials’, and although researchers have linked 
                                                            
11 Interview with Lawyer (Defence) 8 November 2013. 
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them to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people (Petit, 2010; Gillison, 2012), 
investigations in the two cases have been characterised by disagreements between national and 
international staff12 as to whether the suspects should fall within the court’s personal 
jurisdiction of ‘senior leaders’ and ‘those most responsible’ (Kunst, 2013: 17). Outside the 
court, Hun Sen has publically stated that Case 002 should be the KRT’s last (Se, 2010), leading 
to speculation that the RGC is actively opposing subsequent cases from progressing (DeFalco, 
2014). Although official charges were eventually made,13 the case against Im Chaem was 
dismissed in February 2017, due to a finding that she was neither ‘a senior leader or one of 
those most responsible officials’ of the Khmer Rouge regime.14 This has led commentators to 
critique the KRT for its failure to acknowledge the role of politics, describing the dismissal as 
a ‘farce and pretence of justice’ (Wallace, 2017). Concerns that the remaining cases will never 
make it to trial were raised again in May 2017, when a leaked document revealed that the Co-
Investigating Judges were considering a ‘permanent stay on proceedings’ due to ‘lack of 
funding’, and that such a move would be ‘prevent any re-opening of the investigations’.15 
Funding has certainly been a consistent issue for the KRT, and one that has been interpreted 
by staff as a direct interference with Tribunals’ ability to deliver on its mandate.16 As expressed 
by one interviewee ‘if the judges are dependent, if their work is frustrated by just lack of 
funding, there is no independence, there is no continuity, it impacts on many principles.’17 
However, some commentators have expressed scepticism that funding provides a full 
explanation for the Co-Investigating Judges’ position.18 As a result of these prosecutorial 
choices and challenges, the KRT’s recognition of the victimisations which occurred under the 
Khmer Rouge are currently limited to those captured by Cases 001 and 002.  
While Case 002 would seem to offer broad recognition of harm, due to its focus on the policies 
of the Khmer Rouge, and crimes perpetrated across the country, limitations on victim visibility 
                                                            
12 See e.g. ‘Press Release from the International Reserve Co-Investigating Judge’ (KRT Website, 19 March 2012) 
< www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/press-release-international-reserve-co-investigating-judge> 
13 ‘Mr Meas Muth charged in Case 003’ (KRT Website, 14 December 2015) <www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/mr-
meas-muth-charged-case-003>; ‘The International Co-Investigating Judge charges Ao An in Case 004’ (KRT 
Website, 27 March 2015), <www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/public-affair/international-co-investigating-judge-
charges-ao-case-004>; ‘The International Co-Investigating Judge charges Im Chaem in absentia in Case 004’ 
(KRT Website, 3 March 2015) <www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/public-affair/international-co-investigating-
judge-charges-im-chaem-absentia-case-004-0>. 
14 Although the case is confidential, a public summary of the decision is expected to be released. 
15 ‘Staying Khmer Rouge tribunal cases mulled’ (Phnom Penh Post, 8 May 2017) < 
www.phnompenhpost.com/national/staying-khmer-rouge-tribunal-cases-mulled> 
16 Interview with Judge 1, 7 November 2013. 
17 Interview with Lawyer 1 (Chambers) 11 November 2013. 
18 PP Post  
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result from strategies around what crimes to prosecute. This manifests both in the focus on 
specific crime sites, and specific categories of crime. As has been in the case in previous 
tribunals (Waldorf, 2011;) investigations at the KRT have focused on a limited number of 
specific crime sites. By way of example, the Case 002 Closing Order acknowledges that by the 
end of the regime approximately 200 security centers and countless execution sites had been 
established throughout Cambodia, yet less than 10% are the focus of investigation.19 As noted 
above, such choices may reflect legitimate issues around evidentiary sufficiency and resource 
constraints. However, the use of representative sites may go against the wishes of victims, who 
may seek a more exhaustive form of accountability, and who may have no other official 
mechanism from which to seek recognition and redress (Aptel, 2012: 1367). This was 
evidenced during Case 002’s investigations, when a number of ethnic Vietnamese civil party 
applicants expressed consternation on learning that investigations into crimes committed 
against their ethnic group were limited to certain geographical areas (Nguyen and Sperfeldt, 
2014). In response, their lawyers requested additional investigations, noting that ‘it is critically 
important to our clients’ that additional sites be investigated.20 This request was rejected as 
being raised too late, and the applicants were initially excluded from participating as civil 
parties.  As Nguyen and Sperfeldt (2014: 110) note, such exclusions demonstrate how 
prosecutorial selectivity can impact on the representativeness ‘within and among the victim 
compositions participating in the judicial proceedings’. While the impact of this geographical 
selection has been mitigated to some extent by the broad definition given to civil parties (see 
below), decisions as to what categories of crime to prosecute have continued to have a 
significant impact on the visibility of victims at the KRT.  
The visibility and prosecution of certain crimes over others has long featured in critical 
criminological and victimological analysis, which has sought to dissect why certain types of 
harm so frequently go unacknowledged and uncontrolled (Davies, Francis and Jupp, 1999, 
2014). Although seeking to avoid a reduction of ‘oppression to patriarchy’ (Spencer and 
Walklate, 2016), critical victimology has drawn significantly from feminist scholarship in 
problematizing the persistent invisibility of SGBV (Mawby and Walklate, 1994:19). While 
feminist and critical interventions into ICL have succeeded in bringing about legal and policy 
developments enabling greater recognition of SGBV (Askin, 2003), efforts to acknowledge 
                                                            
19 Case 002, Closing Order, Co-Investigating Judges, Case No. 002/19-09-2007- ECCC-OCIJ, 15 September 
2010, 48. 
20 Civil Party Co-Lawyers, ‘Civil Parties’ Request for Supplementary Investigations Regarding Genocide of the 
Khmer Krom and the Vietnamese’, Document D250/3, 3 December 2009. 
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this type of harm continue to be critiqued as inconsistent and selective (Pritchett, 2008; 
SáCouto and Cleary, 2009). As has been the case in previous ICL courts (Askin, 2003; 
O’Rourke, 2013), the KRT has been criticised for its failure to adequately prosecute SGBV 
crimes (Williams and Palmer, 2015; Killean, 2015; Studzinsky 2011). This failure has been 
attributed to a number of interlinked factors, including the prevalence of a myth that the regime 
prohibited and punished SGBV (Savorn, 2011; Anderson, 2005), resource constraints leading 
to a focus on those crimes most easily proven (Ciorciari and Heindel, 2014: 100-101; Williams 
and Palmer, 2015), a lack of female interpreters, analysts and investigators (Poluda, 2015), a 
lack of sufficient training to enable effective and sensitive interviewing of victims (Killean, 
2015), and a lack of awareness of the stigmatization that faced victims of SGBV (DeLangis 
and Studzinsky, 2012). As a result of these interlinked, Case 001’s indictment included only 
one incident of rape,21 and the prosecutors’ initial submissions in Case 002 contained no 
reference to SGBV at all.22  
This initial invisibility was contested by civil society actors, who published reports 
documenting multiple incidents of rape, forced nudity, sexual mutilation, abuse of pregnant 
women and forced marriage (e.g. Natale, 2011; Jacobsen, 2008: Nakagawa, 2008), hosted 
student forums and radio shows (Ye, 2011), and organised ‘women’s hearings’, at which 
victims of SGBV shared their experiences.23 This work challenged the KRT’s narrative of the 
past, and resonates with critical and feminist victimologies, which refute criminal law as the 
correct framework for identifying victimhood (Mawby and Walklate, 1994), and place victims’ 
voices and experiences at the centre of their methodologies (McGarry and Walklate, 2015).  
Within the KRT framework, victims and their advocates (Lilja, 2013) filed petitions and 
requested further investigations, with varied results.24 In the context of forced marriage, civil 
party representatives successfully requested further investigations, leading to two charges 
being included in Case 002.25 While this development has been applauded as a ‘significant 
positive development’ (Oosterveld, 2011), the KRT’s legal framework has continued to act as 
a limitation on victims’ ability to render themselves visible. Civil parties are unable to initiate 
                                                            
21 Case 001, Decision on Parties’ Requests to Put Certain Matters before the Chamber Pursuant to Rule 87(2), 
001/18-07-227/KRT/TC, 28 October 2009. 
22 Case 002, Introductory Submission, Office of the Co-Prosecutor (confidential) 18 July 2007. 
23 CDP, Reports on the 2011, 2012 and 2013 Proceedings of the Women’s Hearings on Sexual 
Violence Under the Khmer Rouge Regime, all available online at gbvkr.org/publications-and-materials/reports/ 
24 Cited in Case 002, Forwarding Order to the Office of the Co-Prosecutors, 002/19-09-2007-KRT/OCIJ, 13 
March 2009; Case 002, Closing Order, paras. 216 - 220. 
25 Case 002, Closing Order, at 1430, 1442. 
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investigations themselves,26 and civil society organisations cannot compel the KRT to 
investigate specific crimes. This limitation was evidenced by the repeated exclusion of rape 
outside the context of forced marriage within Case 002, despite sustained advocacy.27 Yet, 
investigations into SGBV both inside and outside forced marriage have been undertaken in 
Cases 003 and 004, with civil parties’ evidence cited as a motivating factor.28 This ‘shift in 
attitude’ (Palmer and Williams, 2017) demonstrates how engagement with diverse actors can 
combat ‘elitist blind spots’ (Rajagopal, 2002; Haslam, 2011; Haslam and Edmunds, 2013) and 
how victims and their advocates can contribute to the critical victimological goal of uncovering 
victimizations that may be rendered invisible due to the political climate, social factors, or the 
marginalised status of the victims (Holstein and Miller, 1990; McGarry and Walklate, 2015).  
The importance of this engagement has also been demonstrated in the context of minority 
rights. Civil parties and their advocates have successfully contributed to the inclusion in Case 
002 of allegations of genocide, deportation and other crimes specific to the treatment of the 
Vietnamese (Nguyen and Sperfeldt, 2014),29 while the advocacy of the Khmer Krom ethnic 
minority group and their representatives has drawn attention to the crimes perpetrated against 
that group (Mohan, 2010). As the crimes committed against the Khmer Krom appear most 
prominently within Case 004, that case’s uncertain future risks excluding their harm from the 
KRT’s jurisprudence. Indeed, as explored by Mohan (2010), much experienced by this group 
remains underexposed. It may be that the difficulties these groups have faced in comparison to 
the relative success of SGBV advocacy is in part reflective in part of international funding 
priorities. There is undoubtedly a current momentum behind initiatives address conflict-related 
SGBV,30 as noted by a former civil party lawyer: 
                                                            
26 ECCC Internal Rules, Rule 49(1); Case 002, Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current 
Residents of Svay Rieng Province, Case No. 002/19-09-2007- ECCC-OCIJ, 9 September 2010. 
27 Case 001, Decision on Parties’ Requests to Put Certain Matters before the Chamber Pursuant to Rule 87(2), 
001/18-07-2007-ECCC-TC, 28 October 2009; Case 002, Closing Order, at para 1426. 
28 ECCC Press Release, ‘International Co-Prosecutor requests investigation of alleged sexual and gender-based 
violence in Case 004’, 24 April 2014, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/international-co-prosecutor-requests-
investigation-alleged-sexual-and-gender-based-violence; ‘International Co-Prosecutor Files Supplementary 
Submission in Case 003’ ECCC Website, 4 November 2014, www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/international-co-
prosecutor-files-supplementary-submission-case-003. 
29 Case 002, Closing Order, at 778-814. 
30 See e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000); 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 
2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Situations, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30, 18 October 2013. 
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When you combine the words transitional justice and SGBV, doors are opened, funding 
is there from the UN, from everybody. These are the key words and it is a little bit 
unfortunate for victims of other harms.31 
In contrast, staff from a minority rights NGOs spoke of difficulties in obtaining funding, and 
of trying to advocate on behalf of minorities who continue to face discrimination within 
Cambodia.32 Thus, the popularity of the cause may also impact on the ability of victims and 
civil society actors to raise awareness of overlooked crimes, impacting on the visibility of such 
harms within transitional justice narratives.   
3. Judicial Selectivity and the Civil Party System 
The analysis thus far has focused on the processes of selectivity which have shaped the 
victimisations that are rendered visible through their prosecution as crimes.  This section moves 
to consider the ‘visibility’ of victims within the courtroom, both through the delivery of 
testimony, and through the presence of legal representatives within the courtroom. The KRT 
features a unique civil party participation system, which in theory allows victims’ rights similar 
to the prosecution and defence. Its introduction was heralded as a ‘historical achievement in 
international criminal law’ as victims would be ‘fully involved in proceedings at the ECCC’.33 
However, an analysis of which victims are ‘fully involved’, and what form that involvement 
takes reveals that even those victims whose harms are included within indictments will find 
their visibility shaped by professional elites, legal rules, and the extent to which they have the 
capacity to engage with the trial process.  As a result, recognition of victimhood continues to 
be dependent on both the victims’ own characteristics, and the reactions of others (McAlinden, 
2014).  
In analysing victim visibility through participation, this section focuses particularly on the 
Tribunal’s judiciary. Civil party participation is not contained in either of the Court’s founding 
documents. Instead, the civil party system’s creation is a result of judicial policy-making 
(Rasmussen, 1986). This section therefore focuses on the role of judges in both creating and 
subsequently implementing civil party participation, drawing on theories of judicial behaviour 
to do so. While judicial behaviour within domestic contexts has been subjected to significant 
                                                            
31 Interview with Lawyer (Former CP Team member), 11 September 2015. 
32 Interview with Legal Assistant (CP Team), 10 December 2013. 
33 ‘Historic Achievement in International Criminal Law: Victims of Khmer Rouge Crimes Fully Involved in 
Proceedings of the ECCC’ Statement by the Victims Unit, ECCC Website, 4 February 2008, 
<www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/media/Victim_Unit_Press_Release.pdf> 
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analysis, the role of ICL judges has received relatively little scholarly attention (exceptions 
include Jodoin, 2010; Wessel, 2006).  Yet judicial discretion can be used to further a variety of 
political and legal agendas, with the developing nature of ICL arguably granting even greater 
space for judicial discretion and innovation (Jodoin, 2010). Dominant models of judicial 
behaviour include the strategic model, which perceives judges as motivated by specific political 
and legal goals (Epstein and Knight, 2000), and the attitudinal model, which views the ideas, 
attitudes and values of judges as key influencing factors (Tarr, 2003). While these models 
consider judicial motivations, Baum’s (1995) hierarchal model notes that judges will also be 
constrained by legal rules, other participants, and their own political environments. Rather than 
committing to one specific model, I would argue that these factors are interlinked, and that 
consideration of the goals, attitudes and constraints that arguably shaped the KRT judiciary’s 
attitude to victim participation assists in an analysis of the role legal elites play in shaping 
victim visibility. 
In keeping with Baum’s hierarchal model, it is arguable that the judges’ initial decision to 
create a civil party system was influenced in part by their legal environment. Concerns around 
the appropriateness of using Cambodia’s domestic criminal procedures led the judges to 
broadly interpret their right to seek guidance from international procedure, and draft their own 
Internal Rules (Acquaviva, 2008: 129). In doing so, they would have observed the growing 
international recognition of victims’ rights, as evidenced by the ICC’s Rome Statute and 
numerous international human rights declarations. Indeed, their drafting was accompanied by 
intense lobbying from victims’ advocates, experts and NGOs, who cited such developments 
and promoted the creation of an expansive victim participation system (Saliba, 2009a). Wessel 
(2006) has noted that the role of a ‘humanitarian technocrat’ is often placed on international 
judges, who are encouraged to adopt professional customs and ethics which further 
humanitarian goals. Awareness of such expectations, when combined with the victim-centric 
developments in ICL, may have influenced the judges’ approach.  
Reflecting Tarr’s attitudinal model, it has also been suggested that the judges’ personal 
attitudes towards victim participation, as informed by their own domestic legal backgrounds, 
shaped their approach. Reportedly, most common-law judges favoured a lesser form of 
participation, while the French judge and his legal officer pressed for a French/Cambodian 
styled model, and the national judges favoured the scheme as a way of incorporating 
Cambodian law (Ciorciari and Heindel, 2014: 204). The result was the creation of a system 
which drew from, but also differed from the Cambodian model (Boyle, 2006: 310) and which 
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originally provided for some of the most expansive victims’ rights granted by an ICL court 
(Mohan, 2009). However, the judges’ determination that their Rules constitute the ‘primary 
instrument… in determining procedures’34 and can be amended by the judges themselves, has 
allowed changing judicial strategies and attitudes to exert significant influence over who can 
be considered a victim entitled to participate as a civil party, and what form that participation 
takes. Their approach to these issues will be considered in turn.  
Recognizing Victimhood 
Judicial attitudes towards who should be admitted as a civil party have differed as the KRT has 
proceeded with Cases 001 and 002. The Rules initially required applicants to demonstrate that 
they were ‘victims of a crime coming within the jurisdiction of the KRT, and that their injury 
was ‘physical, material or psychological’ and ‘the direct consequence of the offence, personal 
and have actually come into being.’35 Thus, applications could be submitted in relation to any 
crimes that fell under the Court’s jurisdiction.36 Applications were also allowed from indirect 
victims, and in certain cases the successors of a deceased applicant.37 However, in 2010 the 
judges amended the Rules, requiring applicants to ‘demonstrate as a direct consequence of at 
least one of the crimes alleged against the Charged Person, that he or she has in fact suffered 
physical, material or psychological injury’.38 This amendment followed an announcement on 
the scope of Case 002, and with Case 002 encompassing complex crimes and multiple 
defendants, the judges were undoubtedly aware of the impact incorporating large numbers of 
victims might have on trial expediency (McGonigle Leyh, 2011). It is therefore arguable that 
the amendment was an attempt to limit applications to victims connected to Case 002’s specific 
crimes and sites (Studzinsky, 2011), furthering a strategy of trial expediency, rather than victim 
inclusion. 
The changes were made a few months before the Case 001 judgment, and after the deadline for 
Case 002 applications. However, they were retrospectively applied, contributing to 23 civil 
party applicants having their status revoked in the Case 001 trial judgment.39 The applicants 
had participated throughout the trial, and had not been informed that their status was 
provisional. The decision caused extreme distress (Ciorciari and Heindel, 2014: 62); with the 
                                                            
34 Case 002, Decision on Nuon Chea’s Appeal against Order Refusing Request for Annulment, 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC/OCIJ, 26 August 2008.  Emphasis added. 
35 Internal Rules, Revision 3, 6 March 2009, Rule 23(2) 
36 KRT Law, Arts. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
37 Case 001, Trial Judgment. 
38 Internal Rules, Revision 5, 9 February 2010. 
39 Case 001, Trial Judgment, paras. 647 – 649. 
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applicants perceiving the revocation of civil party status as a rejection of their experiences of 
harm (O’Toole, 2010). While the status of ten individuals was restored on appeal,40 these strong 
reactions demonstrate the potentially harmful processes of exclusion that can result from 
linking victim recognition to legal institutions. The decision has since been critiqued by other 
judges as ‘insensitive’, and of being a reaction to the ‘obscure’ nature of the legal framework.41 
Certainly, the civil party system’s unique and ‘experimental’ nature limited the external 
guidance available to judges,42 which may also have influenced the changeable nature of its 
implementation.  
The issue of civil party eligibility also proved divisive in Case 002. Applicants were initially 
required to show ‘personal’43 harm which resulted from material facts for which a judicial 
investigation had been opened.44 This excluded applicants who had suffered from identical 
conduct at geographical sites not included within investigations. Of the 3,970 applications 
considered, 2,123 were admitted, and of the rejected applicants, 1,747 appealed.45 The appeal 
decision revealed significantly different judicial attitudes, as the majority admitted applicants 
who claimed harm related to crimes alleged against the accused in locations excluded from 
investigations.46  The majority further found that Cambodia’s social and cultural context during 
the regime required a broader consideration of victimization, allowing for injury to be caused 
through the death of members of the appellant’s community, through the witnessing of direct 
victimization, through the knowledge of a direct victims’ fate, and through the fear of a similar 
fate that the policies instilled.47 As a result, 1,728 appeals were granted, increasing the number 
of civil parties to 3,866.  
In addition to highlighting the role legal institutions play in shaping victimhood through 
jurisdictional limits and substantive criteria (Robins, 2017; Kendall, 2015), these decisions 
demonstrate how victim recognition can fluctuate as a result of changing case law and judicial 
strategies (Kendall and Nouwen, 2013: 246). Interviews conducted with judges and judicial 
officers highlighted how divisive this issue had been. Reflecting the attitudinal model, 
                                                            
40 Case 001, Appeal Judgement, at 252 – 280. 
41 Interview with Judge 1, 7 November 2013 and Judge 4, 13 January 2014. 
42 Interview with Judge 1, 7 November 2013. 
43 Case 002, Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current Residents of Oddar Meanchey 
Province, 002/19-09-2007-KRT-OCIJ, 26 August 2010, at 13. 
44 Case 002, Closing Order, at 10 -12. 
45 Case 002, Decision on Appeals against Orders of the Co-Investigating Judges on the Admissibility of Civil 
Party Applications, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-PTC, 24 June 2011.  
46 Ibid at 76 – 77. 
47 Ibid at 83 – 92. 
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interviewees appeared to be influenced by their own legal traditions, but also by their 
understandings of what the court’s role should be in recognising and responding to victims. 
Thus, some interviewees from civil law backgrounds disagreed with the majority’s expansive 
interpretation of victimization, which shifts away from civil law’s required link with the 
specific crimes charged.48 Indeed, French Judge Machi-Uhel issued a dissenting judgment, 
arguing that the inclusive approach would frustrate those who satisfied the original narrower 
criteria, while disappointing those who were admitted but did not subsequently see their 
specific harms reflected in the Court’s work. 49 In contrast, those who supported the majority 
position spoke of the importance of acknowledging the nature of harm under the regime50 and 
avoiding ‘inappropriate re-victimization…by their exclusion’.51  
While exclusions arise whenever legal institutions are used as the basis for recognising 
victimhood (Mawby and Walklate, 1994), the grave harms which form the subject matter of 
ICL courts render such exclusions particularly emotionally charged (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2013), as illustrated by the distress expressed by rejected applicants. However, 
even a broad policy of recognition will exclude some. This reality is demonstrated by Case 
002, which focuses on criminal policies which arguably harmed the entire Cambodian 
population. While the majority decision eliminated the distinction drawn between those who 
had been harmed in one location from those harmed in another, the policy of broad recognition 
did not dispel arbitrary distinctions. Instead, the distinction became between those with the 
means to apply for civil party status, and those without. This distinction reflects what 
Rombouts and Vandeginste (2003) term the ‘public recognition selection process’, in which 
only some have the ‘power’ to pursue recognition of their victimhood. Indeed, the argument 
has been made that justice is predominantly pursued by ‘urban elites and high-profile victims, 
who have a strong moral voice and an ability to clearly articulate demands’ but who may not 
be representative of all who have suffered harm (Van der Merwe, 2014: 200).  
Access to assistance may also create distinctions. In addition to requiring the energy and time 
to engage with the Tribunal, which victims who are struggling to meet their basic needs may 
not have (Kendall and Nouwen, 2013), victims may face practical barriers, such as limited 
                                                            
48 Interview with Judge 4, 13 January 2014; Interview with Lawyer 2 (Chambers), 11 November 2013. 
49 Case 002, Decision on Appeals Against Orders of the Co-Investigating Judges on the Admissibility of Civil 
Party Applications, Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Marchi-Uhel, 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC/PTC, 24 June 2011. 
50 Interview with Judge 2, 11 November 2013. 
51 Interview with Judge 1, 7 November 2013. 
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internet access or literacy skills,52 which make them dependent on outside assistance. Indeed 
84% of civil party applications were submitted through intermediary NGOs (Sperfeldt, 2012). 
Such statistics evidence the arbitrary distinctions between recognised and unrecognised 
victimhood: while evidence suggests that nearly all Cambodians who lived through the regime 
consider themselves victims (Pham et al., 2011), only a small fraction can pursue recognition 
and redress at the KRT (Ciorciari and Heindel, 2014: 207). As Robins (2017: 54) has noted, 
‘rights are mediated by the actors who articulate them’, and ‘become something that are largely 
claimed on behalf of victims rather than by victims themselves.’ The result is that victim 
recognition is often dependent on expert assistance, enhancing the control elites exercise over 
victim recognition, and potentially excluding those victims who may be unable to access 
assistance due to geographical isolation, structural inequalities, or social marginalisation (Van 
der Merwe, 2014).  
Visibility through Participation  
This final sub-section analyses the attitudes, strategies and constraints that arguably influenced 
the judges’ approach towards victim visibility through representation and through the provision 
of testimony. Reflecting Epstein and Knight’s (2000) strategic model, this section demonstrates 
that balancing the multiple strategies of ensuring expeditious proceedings, protecting the rights 
of civil parties, securing ‘local legitimacy’ (Mégret, 2009) and following international fair trial 
standards (White, 2017, 206) made implementing civil party participation a complex task. 
Members of the judiciary have acknowledged that giving effect to these diverse principles 
raised numerous practical challenges as the trials progressed,53 challenges which ultimately 
resulted in restrictions being placed on the rights available to civil parties.  
With regards to visibility through testimony, civil parties were offered a number of 
opportunities to directly express their sense of victimisation to the courtroom. In addition to 
providing testimony, civil parties were given opportunities to make ‘statements of suffering’ 
and participate in separate victim impact hearings. The two latter modes of participation were 
the result of innovations by the Trial Chamber,54 and allowed civil parties space to render their 
victimisations visible within the proceedings without being constrained by specific questions 
                                                            
52 ‘Cambodia Statistics’, World Bank Website, data.worldbank.org/country/Cambodia 
53 Decision on Civil Party Lawyer’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to make 
Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses 
Testifying on Character ‘Duch’, 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC (9 October2009), Lavergne Dissent, para 3. 
54 Case 002, Decision on Request to Recall Civil Party TCCp-187, for Review of Procedure Concerning Civil 
Parties’ Statements of Suffering and Related Motions and Responses, 002/19-0902007-ECCC-TC, 2 May 2013;  
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related to the charges. While this reflected a strategy of victim inclusivity, the retributive 
culture of the trial proved ‘not at all conducive to listening to the accounts of individuals’ 
(Doak, 2005: 298); and testifying civil parties also occasionally faced requests that they limit 
themselves to facts relevant to the trial,55 reminders that they be brief,56 and rebukes for 
showing emotion in a courtroom setting.57 As has been argued by Doak and Tayler (2013: 25) 
the constraints of a trial may result in victims delivering only a ‘sanitized and innocuous version 
of events’, rather than being able to fully render their harm visible to the court. The judicial 
approach to these forms of testimony displayed an inherent tension between a desire to 
maintain the legal structure of a trial, and allowing victims to express their harm (Dembour and 
Haslam, 2004).  
It must also be acknowledged that few victims were able to participate in this way. Although 
the number of civil parties who have addressed the court directly has increased with each trial 
(22 in Case 001, 31 in Case 002/01, and 63 in Case 002/02),58 the percentage of civil parties 
given an opportunity to speak has remained low, with less than 2% participating directly in 
Cases 002/01 and 002/02 (Cohen, Hyde and van Tuyl, 2015: 28). Decisions as to which victims 
would be rendered visible through direct participation were also constrained by the format of 
the trial: each civil party who appeared as a witness was chosen for substantive evidential 
purposes, while those who participated in the impact hearings were chosen based on their 
ability to assist the Chamber with assessing ‘the gravity of the crimes, in their proper context 
and determining the appropriateness of the reparations claimed’.59 The implications of such 
choices on victim visibility were particularly illustrated by the decision to split Case 002 into 
sub-trials, with only those victims whose harms fell within the factual scope of the sub-trials 
able to participate (Heindel, 2013). Thus, while opportunities for expression were greater than 
those granted to a witness, victims’ voices continued to be ‘picked out, appropriated and then 
re-presented to suit’ the particular structure and goals of the trial (McEvoy and McConnachie, 
2012, 495). 
                                                            
55 Case 001, Trial Transcript, 20 June 2009 at 13; 1 July 2009 at 14; 20 August 2009 at 64; 24 August 2009 at 71. 
56 Case 002, Trial Transcript, 29 August 2012 at 28-30. 
57 Case 001, Trial Transcript, 30 June 2009, at 12. 
58 ‘Highlights of Issues Related to Civil Party Participation’, Khmer Rouge Trial Monitor, 9 October 2013, 
krtmonitor.org/2013/10/09/highlights-civil-party-participation/; ‘KRT Monitor Case 002/02 – Issue 79 (9-11 
January 2017), Khmer Rouge Trial Monitor, 9 February 2017, krtmonitor.org/2017/02/09/krt-monitor-case-
00202-issue-79-9-11-january-2017/ 
59 ‘The Purpose of Hearing Victims’ Suffering’ ECCC Website, 
<www.ecccc.gov.kh/en/blog/2013/07/07/purpose-hearing-victims-suffering> 
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A strategy of protecting the legal structure of the trial is also evident in judges’ attitudes towards 
victims who attempted to engage in more direct forms of participation. Following repeated 
attempts by one civil party to address the Court directly and question the accused, a decision 
was made that to ensure ‘expeditious proceedings and relevant submissions, and to avoid 
disruptions’, civil parties should only participate through their lawyers.60 The reality of a victim 
wishing to speak for herself in this way appeared to contrast with how the judges envisioned 
civil party participation, as demonstrated by Mohan’s (2009) interviews with staff in the 
aftermath of these events: 
… individual victims cannot be allowed to speak in court as they are emotional. Judges 
do not want to hear only about their mental anguish alone, that is for a psychiatrist, 
not a court of law. 
This rejection of ‘emotional’ victims and the distinction made between the ‘psychiatrist’ and 
the ‘court of law’ arguably illustrates a desire to limit civil party visibility to that required to 
pursue the court’s retributive goals. Thus, attitudinal theories of judicial behaviour find 
traction, as attitudes towards one specific civil party combined with broader understandings of 
what a trial can ‘hold’ (Elander, 2013), leading to a significant shift in judicial strategy, and a 
curtailment of civil party rights. 
Due to the low percentage of civil parties who provided testimony or statements, participation 
for the majority has been predominantly enacted through their legal representatives. The 
introduction of victim representatives within a number of ICL institutions has been praised as 
signalling a shift towards more ‘victim-oriented justice’ (Vasiliev, 2009) and for enabling 
victims’ interests to be protected and represented within proceedings (Moffett, 2014). 
However, the use of representatives inevitably raises its own challenges around victim 
visibility, as legal representatives play a central role in shaping which victimisations are 
rendered visible through participation, which voices are re-produced within their submissions 
and statements, and what strategies are pursued within the courtroom (Killean and Moffett, 
2017; Mazzei and Jackson, 2012; Madlingozi, 2010). This role is arguably amplified within 
the context of ICL: lawyers may be attempting to represent a large multitude of victimised 
individuals, and the power dynamics that may exist between victimised communities and legal 
elites may enhance the control representatives have over what narratives are portrayed (Killean 
                                                            
60 Case 002, Written Version of Oral Decision of 1 July 2008 on the Civil Party’s Request to Address the Court 
in Person, Pre-Trial Chamber, 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, 3 July 2008. 
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and Moffett, 2017). Thus, it must be remembered that even those engaged in promoting the 
visibility of victims may misappropriate their voices, or overlook those who may be 
particularly disenfranchised due to their race, gender, or social status (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2013; Mohan, 1999, 46).  
Representatives can also find their own ability to render their clients’ interests visible within 
proceedings subject to restrictions, and while being cognisant of the role representatives play 
in shaping the pyramid of victimhood, the rest of this section focuses on the ways in visibility 
through representation has been shaped by judicial attitudes, strategies and constraints. 
Although during Case 001 the trial judges initially showed support for broad participatory 
rights, they quickly began to show irritation towards civil party representatives, chastising them 
for repetitive questioning61 and limiting the situations in which they could question witnesses 
and the accused.62 In the lead up to Case 002, the judges amended the Rules on representation, 
introducing two Lead Co-lawyers tasked with the overall advocacy, strategy and in-court 
representation of civil parties. As a result, civil parties no longer participate as individual 
‘parties’, but as one consolidated group (Diamond, 2010-2011). The change in representation 
resulted in a significant curtailment of the visibility of victims within the courtroom, with the 
proportion of time utilised by civil party representatives constituting just 15% of Case 002/01, 
compared to 41% of Case 001 (Cohen, Hyde and van Tuyl, 2015: 27-28). The Lead Co-
Lawyers also had their ability to speak restricted, with the Trial Chamber excluding them from 
making opening statements, and expressing irritation when they intervened separately from the 
prosecution, stating that the two parties should cooperate in order to make proceedings 
efficient.63 
This statement is illustrative of one of the primary factors that has arguably shaped judicial 
approaches to victim representation: a desire for expediency.  As with other courts, the KRT is 
tasked with conducting trials in a fair and expeditious manner,64 but expediency has acquired 
particular importance in the Cambodian context due to the time which has passed since the 
crimes charged, and the advanced age of the accused (Brinkley, 2013). Indeed, the death of 
two accused during Case 002 poignantly highlighted the impact prolonged proceedings can 
have on the KRT’s ability to deliver accountability. In addition, the KRT relies predominantly 
on donor funding from states, and has faced increasing donor fatigue and resulting financial 
                                                            
61 Case 001, Trial Transcripts, 29 July 2009 at 88 – 90. 
62 Case 001, Trial Transcript, 27 August 2009. 
63 Case 002, Trial Transcript, 2 February 2012, at 30. 
64 Internal Rule 79 (7) 
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constraints (Sperfeldt, 2012: 154). The judges therefore faced the challenge of balancing an 
unprecedented victim participation system and the associated legal teams, with external 
pressure to deliver expedient judgements. The priority given to trial management and 
expediency was reflected in interviews: one judge conceded that the introduction of the Lead 
Co-Lawyers was a result of being unable to ‘live up to the promise of the legal framework…we 
couldn’t handle it otherwise’, 65 while another argued that ‘to have retained individual 
representation would have meant that the case would never finish and therefore our primary 
remit wouldn’t have been discharged’. 66 With little experience of large ICL trials to draw on 
(Ciorciari and Heindel, 2014:380), the judges attempted to deal with trial management issues 
as they arose, adopting a strategy that increasingly prioritised expediency and efficiency as the 
two trials proceeded.  
This approach has not escaped criticism. Restrictions imposed during Case 001 caused dismay 
amongst civil parties (Saliba, 2009b), and the judges’ overall approach has since been critiqued 
by commentators as ‘reactive and unpredictable’ (Cohen, Hyde and van Tuyl, 2015). Nor were 
decisions to restrict the rights of civil party representatives unanimous. In a notable dissenting 
opinion, the French Judge Lavergne criticized the decision to exclude civil parties from giving 
character evidence. Whilst acknowledging the challenges associated with balancing the rights 
of victims with expedient trials and the rights of the defence, he questioned ‘[h]ow far one can 
go without breaching the spirit of the law, or fundamentally distorting the meaning of the 
involvement of civil parties…?’67 Such decisions demonstrate the different judicial attitudes 
towards the purposes of the trial and the role of civil parties within it, as well as the continued 
influence of domestic legal jurisdictions. The introduction of the Lead Co-Lawyers has also 
been criticized as effectively severing the civil parties’ attorney-client relationship, and limiting 
victims’ ability to exercise agency through their representative’s courtroom strategy (Ciorciari 
and Heindel, 2014: 222). The introduction of collective representation also has significant 
implications for the visibility of those victims whose experiences appear contradictory or 
outside the focus of proceedings, who may find their experiences excluded from the official 
victims’ narrative (Killean and Moffett, 2017). This does not reflect the reality of individual 
experiences of harm, as acknowledged by one judge, ‘the collective representation here has 
had some difficulties, and that’s because victims are not homogenous as a group’.68  
                                                            
65 Interview with Judge 4, 13 January 2014. 
66 Interview with Judge 1, 7 November 2013. 
67 Lavergne Dissent, supra n.52, para. 4. 
68 Interview with Judge 1, 7 November 2013. 
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This section has demonstrated how judicial behaviour has acted as a final narrowing of the 
pyramid of victim visibility at the KRT. Diverse legal backgrounds, differing attitudes towards 
the purposes of the Court, an unprecedented approach to victim participation in an ICL court 
and pressures from inside and outside the Court have influenced judicial strategies in a way 
that has led to the curtailment of victim visibility. While the KRT has provided victims with 
space to share their stories within the courtroom, this is available to only a small percentage of 
victims, and has been constrained by the judges’ focus on the retributive goals of a trial. As a 
result, even those at the ‘apex of the pyramid’ (Kendall and Nouwen, 2013: 251) are faced with 
processes of exclusion. It has been argued that more effective trial management from the start 
would have allowed the judges to avoid placing restrictions on civil party representatives and 
enabled, enabling greater victim-visibility to be maintained (Zhang, 2016: 529). However, 
while the judges’ role in limiting victims’ role at the KRT has been the subject of this section, 
the inherent limitations of responding to victimisation through a criminal trial must continue to 
be acknowledged. The ‘theft of the conflict’ from the victims, the dominance of legal 
professionals and legalese, the retributive focus of the trial, the rights of the accused and the 
pressures of expedient justice create barriers a truly victim-centric process. Thus, as has been 
argued within domestic contexts (Mawby and Walklate, 1994: 189-198) participation in 
criminal proceedings should not be the only ‘right’ offered to those who have suffered 
victimisation, but should fall within the context of a broader response.  
4. Conclusion. 
As Miers (1989) has noted, many groups and individuals can claim the label of ‘victim’, but 
the key questions for a critical victimologist are who has the power to apply the label and what 
considerations are significant in that determination. Drawing from this critical starting point, 
this article has made the argument that in the context of the KRT in Cambodia, as in other 
contexts (Mawby and Walklate, 1994), recognition of victimhood has been narrowed by a 
myriad of heterogeneous actors pursuing a variety of political, legal and social goals. Applying 
the critical victimological argument that terms such as ‘victim’ and ‘victimization’ are 
contested and open to manipulation (Dignan, 2005), it has explored how both the initial 
creation of the KRT and the way its practitioners have approached their work have excluded 
numerous individuals who have suffered harm from its remit, leaving many outside Kendall 
and Nouwen’s pyramid of victimhood.  
To conclude, I would argue that there is a need within ICL scholarship and practice to greater 
acknowledge the role of actors and contexts in shaping responses to victimization. Such 
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responses are sites of contestation (Haslam, 2007), in which the agendas of different 
transitional justice practitioners and other elites often play a significant role in demarcating the 
extent to which the real needs of victim populations in the aftermath of atrocity are addressed 
by transitional justice mechanisms. This can lead to restrictions being placed on the kind of 
victimisations which are rendered visible and worthy of redress, as evidenced by the 
compromises struck between the international community and RGC in creating and limiting 
the jurisdiction if the KRT. However, it can also lead to innovative processes which enhance 
victim visibility, for example through the creation of the civil party system and the work of 
civil society in expanding the Court’s investigations and prosecutions to include greater 
acknowledgment of SGBV and crimes against minority groups. Acceptance of justice as a 
place of constraints and contest may contribute to greater honesty and humility in the discourse 
surrounding transitional justice (McEvoy, 2007). Such an increase in honesty and humility 
would provide welcome balance to the increased use of ‘justice for victims’ as legitimising 
rhetoric (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2013). By acknowledging the inherent limitations 
associated with using a criminal legal framework to define and recognise victimhood, trials can 
be more appropriately understood as one element of broader responses to grave victimisations. 
Unfortunately, when a small number of selective criminal trials form the only official response 
to atrocity, as has been the case in Cambodia, these layered processes of exclusion leave many 
harms invisible and many victims ultimately without redress.  
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